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WillowOne's Positions

Problem of evil

"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?"
- attributed to Epicurus, as reported by David Hume in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), Part X

Overview

The problem of evil is the difficulty of reconciling the existence of suffering with a god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Such a god would know about every instance of suffering, could prevent it, and would want to. Suffering exists. At least one of the three attributes must therefore be given up.

The logical problem claims the three attributes and the existence of evil are strictly inconsistent. The evidential problem, which is the stronger form, claims only that the amount and distribution of suffering, in particular suffering that serves no visible purpose (a fawn burning slowly in a forest fire, in William Rowe's example), is far more probable on the assumption that no such god exists.

Standard replies and why they fail

  • Free will. Suffering is the price of human freedom. This does not cover natural evil (earthquakes, childhood cancer, parasites), and it assumes freedom is worth any quantity of suffering, which a benevolent being would not assume. See Freewill vs Determinism on whether the freedom in question even exists.
  • Soul-making. Suffering builds character. It also destroys it, and much suffering falls on those (infants, animals) who cannot learn from it.
  • Mysterious ways. God has reasons we cannot know. This abandons the claim that the god is good in any sense we understand, and makes the attribute unfalsifiable (Popper's Razor). It is also an Appeal to Ignorance.
  • Hell makes it worse. A god who permits suffering in this life and then inflicts infinite suffering in the next has not solved the problem; see Hell.

Also see