Sex and Gender
My Positions
- People should use the toilet they consider appropriate, with ordinary expectations of privacy and conduct.
- My preference is for governing bodies of sports to justify their rules using evidence relevant to their sport.
- In both cases the demand binary answers to problems whose complexity we otherwise acknowledge, we obstruct the development of meaningful, pragmatic solutions.
Sex and Gender in society
My starting point is that useful categories and respect for individuals are compatible. We should be able to discuss the purposes of sex-based distinctions without treating transgender people as problems to be eliminated. Equally, recognising someone’s dignity need not settle every question about access, classification or competitive fairness.
I am suspicious of language that makes a disputed conclusion seem inevitable before the argument has begun. Describing every accommodation as a threat, or every objection as hatred, makes careful consideration harder.
The existence of difficult cases does not, by itself, make a category meaningless. To argue otherwise risks the continuum fallacy: assuming that a distinction has no value unless its boundary is perfectly sharp. Conversely, the usefulness of a category does not establish that every application of it is justified.
Wittgenstein’s idea of language-games offers a related insight: words acquire meaning through their use within human practices. They need not all possess a single, exceptionless definition to remain intelligible. This does not settle what “man” or “woman” should mean in every setting; it encourages us to ask what a particular distinction is doing. A medical classification, a sporting eligibility rule and an ordinary social description need not serve identical purposes.
It is reasonable to organise institutions around common circumstances. It is also reasonable to expect them to accommodate people whose circumstances differ. Neither principle is absolute, nor one come at the expense of the other. The relevant questions concern the seriousness of competing needs, the evidence of harm, and the feasibility of alternatives. Being in a minority does not diminish someone’s claim to consideration; being in a majority does not make a concern illegitimate.
Public toilets and sport have become particular flashpoints in the debate over sex and gender, serving as tests of competing sensitivities and the limits of tolerance. I shall consider each in turn.
Public toilets
Toilets present a practical problem that should not require everyone to agree on a comprehensive philosophy of sex and gender.
Several approaches deserve consideration. Shared facilities may raise objections concerning safety, privacy and comfort. Fully enclosed individual toilets offer greater privacy, although conversion may involve costs and constraints on space or capacity. Additional facilities available to anyone could provide another option, but requiring only transgender people to use them risks making that provision feel like segregation.
Safety claims require evidence. A Massachusetts study comparing localities with and without gender-identity protections found no significant association between those protections and reported criminal incidents in toilets, changing rooms and locker rooms. That is relevant evidence against predictions of increased crime. Its reliance on police reports and its geographical limits mean that it cannot settle every question about safety, privacy or personal comfort.
My preference remains an approach that allows people to use the toilet they consider appropriate, with ordinary expectations of privacy and conduct applying to everyone. I would favour practical accommodation over intrusive scrutiny.
I recognise that my preference may be easier to express as a man who does not experience these concerns in the same way as others.
In April 2025, the Supreme Court held that “sex”, “man” and “woman” in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex. It also affirmed that transgender people retain protection against discrimination. Any proposal for single-sex provision must engage with that legal framework rather than assume that personal choice alone determines access.
The absence of a perfect arrangement does not prove that previous practice was best. It does, however, count against treating disruption as an achievement in itself. To pretend that their is a simple solution is to close the door to pragmatism. The aim should be usable facilities, proportionate safeguards and dignity for everyone.
Sport
Sport has never interested me greatly. I do not care much who runs fastest or which team wins this year. But my indifference is not an argument against taking seriously something that matters deeply to others. I say this as I am no more interested in sport, than I am a trans-athlete; and my views should be considered in that context.
The question is what makes competition fair, or perhaps worthwhile, within a particular category. It is too strong to claim that transgender women would generally dominate all women’s sport or leave other women unrepresented in all sports; but in some cases it may be true.
A 2021 systematic review reported that some differences in strength and muscle measures persisted after hormone treatment. A February 2026 meta-analysis reported comparable results on several measures of physical fitness, while rating much of the evidence as low or very low certainty. These findings concern particular measurements and populations; they do not establish one universal answer about competitive performance across all sports.
Fairness also concerns the opportunities through which sporting ability develops. Girls may encounter discouragement, restrictive expectations and barriers to participation that boys do not experience to the same extent. The House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee documented these obstacles in its 2024 report on women and girls in sport.
Even if medical treatment fully equalised the physical characteristics relevant to a particular sport, it would not necessarily erase advantages arising from earlier access to encouragement, coaching or competition. A transgender woman who previously benefited from those opportunities might retain acquired skills and experience that some women raised and treated as girls had fewer opportunities to develop. This is a plausible consideration, rather than an established advantage shared by all transgender women.
I therefore think the debate should consider sporting development as well as present physiology. Individual histories matter: neither transgender status nor sex alone tells us what opportunities someone received. Unequal opportunities also exist within each group. This consideration does not, by itself, settle eligibility, but it explains why physical comparisons may leave part of the fairness question unanswered.
My preference is for governing bodies to justify their rules using evidence relevant to their sport, its competitive level and any safety considerations. Where weight classes or other classifications genuinely address the relevant differences, they deserve consideration. They should not be assumed to solve every problem.
Most importnatly however we recognise that such determinations are likely difficult and imperfect; we should respect that whilst ensuring they remain open to critique and review. Governing bodies still owe participants clear reasons, consistent procedures and a willingness to reconsider decisions when evidence changes. Acknowledging difficulty does not place their choices beyond criticism.
Recreational participation and elite competition may also warrant different priorities. A rule designed to protect opportunities at the highest competitive level need not automatically be the best rule for a casual local activity.
I want an approach that preserves useful distinctions, accommodates people wherever reasonably possible, and assesses competing claims without exaggerating them. Imperfect answers are unavoidable. Careless reasoning and unnecessary humiliation are not.
Conclusion
When we demand binary answers to problems whose complexity we otherwise acknowledge, we obstruct the development of meaningful, pragmatic solutions.
Elsewhere, we readily recognise that a workable rule need not be an exceptionless one. We can preserve common educational standards while adjusting how pupils are assessed, or restrict vehicles in public spaces while allowing access for particular needs. Such accommodations do not necessarily undermine the underlying arrangement; they can make it work more fairly. It seems that it's only when these issues are being wielded as political weapons that the positions appear impossible to navigate.
Sources
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Ludwig Wittgenstein. Background on language-games, meaning as use and family resemblance; the application to this debate is the author’s argument.
- Hasenbush, Flores and Herman — Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Laws in Public Accommodations: a Review of Evidence Regarding Safety and Privacy in Public Restrooms, Locker Rooms, and Changing Rooms (published online 2018). Original study, including methods and limitations.
- UK Supreme Court — For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers, [2025] UKSC 16 (16 April 2025). Full judgment; particularly paragraphs 248–266 on discrimination protections and the Court’s conclusions.
- Harper and colleagues — How does hormone transition in transgender women change body composition, muscle strength and haemoglobin? (2021). Systematic review, available through Loughborough University’s repository.
- Sieczkowska and colleagues — Body composition and physical fitness in transgender versus cisgender individuals: a systematic review with meta-analysis (February 2026). PubMed record and abstract, including links to subsequent correction notices.
- House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee — Health barriers for girls and women in sport (2024). See particularly the chapter on barriers to girls’ participation.
Also see
- Colourblind social policy, the principle that the state should see individuals, not categories, and the question this note puts to it
- Equality, on factual inequality and moral equality
- Equality of opportunity
- Gay Marriage and Gay Adoption
- Free Speech
- Harm principle
- Continuum Fallacy
- Language Games
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Religious Exemptions in Law, for the same method applied to another protected characteristic
